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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
vVILLIAM J{. I-IO\'r ARD, RUTH N. 
I-I OW ARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD, 
and SHIRI.JEY I_l. I-IO\'r"'\RD, 
Plrtintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
~1ILDRED ~f. I-IO\VARD, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
l\fiLDRED l\1. HOW AR.D, 
Defendant and Third Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
\\r ALICER BANI< & TRUST COl\1-
p ANY, as Administrator of the estate 
of L. W. IIO\'r ARD, deceased, WIL-
LIAM. l{. HOW_._L\RD, RUTH N. HO-
WARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD and 
SHIRLEY L. HO\V ARD, 
Third Party Defendants, 
and Respondents, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEl\1ENT OF THE CASE 
Case 
No. 9552 
This case is prosecuted to set aside a \V arranty Deed 
given by the grantor during his lifetime to the grantee 
in which deed the description was not a perfect one but 
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which appellant contends was sufficient to convey the 
property intended. Appellant prayed for judgment re-
forming the description to give effect to the deed. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The lower court adjudged the deed to be of no force 
or effect and ruled that the property intended to be con-
veyed remained in the grantor, and denied the prayer of 
appellant to have the deed reformed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That the deed be adjudged good and valid and that 
title to the property therein described be decreed that of 
the grantee, or if such judgment is not directed then that 
the case be remanded to the lower court for trial. 
STATEJIENT OF FACTS 
Respondents herein are children of L. ''"'"· Howard, 
who died intestate in Salt Lake ·County, t7tah, on Nov-
meber 30th, 1955, born of a deceased first ,vife of said 
L. W. Howard. Appellant is the surviving \vido'v of said 
L. W. Howard, the 1nother of t'vo children by L. W. 
Howard. During hi~ lifetime, L. W. Howard held title 
to a tract of land in Holladay, Salt Lake County, Utah 
from which he and appellant herein conveyed three par-
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eels designated on map appended hereto, which parcels 
are therein designated as Tracts "A", "B", and "C". 
On ~lay 9th, 1945, I.J. ''T· Howard drafted in his O\Vn 
hand, a "'"arranty deed naming his wife, appellant herein, 
as grantee~ \vhich deed describes the property as follows : 
C~om at ·a point :2.07 ch, ,V. & S. 52°30'E.5.24 ch 
from Northeast cor. of Northwest l;i of sec 10 
T 2 S R. 1 E S.L.B. & ~f and running thence N 56° 
E 3.55 ch. thence S 39° E 6.15 ch thence· S 47° W 
5.88 ch thence S 54°15'W 214.25 ft. thence N 46.0 
25'W 404 ft more or less to a point which is South 
55°30' W455 ft. thence S 46°25'E 154 ft. thence 
S43°35'West 160 ft. more or less from beginning 
Less roads 
Less Temple & Woods 
Less Theatre 
Containing 2.75 acres more or less 
The deed \Vas delivered to appellant with instructions to 
place the same of record in the office of the Cotmty 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, lJtah, upon the death of 
L. W. Howard. Appellant did on December 1st, 1955, 
record said deed in the office of the County Recorder and 
the same was recorded in Book 1263, page 45 of the 
county records (R. 43). 
On l\Iay 13, 1947 the said L. W. Ho·w·ard made an-
other deed naming his '\\rife, the appellant herein, as 
grantee, describing a tract shown on the appended map 
as Tract "D." This deed 'vas also delivered by said L. W. 
Howard to appellant during the lifetime of L. W. Howard 
and appellant recorded this deed in the office of the 
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County Recorder of Salt Lake ·County, Utah, on Decem-
ber 1st, 1955. The description contained in this deed is 
a good and sufficient description. (R. 4). 
Appellant claims title to the properties covered by 
each of said deeds by virtue of the grant therein eon-
tabled. Respondents instituted these proceedings in the 
lower court praying that the court decree that the deeds 
from L. W. Howard to appellant are null and void and 
of no effect and that the property described in each of 
said deeds be decree that of L. W. Howard at the time 
of his death (R. 1-8). Appellant answered the com-
plaint of respondents and also filed her cross-complaint 
as against Walker Bank & Trust Company as admini-
strator of the estate of L. W. Howard, deceased, and 
against respondents, praying that the deed bearing date 
May 9th, 1945 be revised so as to express the true intent 
and meaning of L. W. Howard, and that appellant be 
adjudged and decree the owner in fee simple of the land 
described by said deeds. (R. 16-20) 
The case was called for pre-trial at which the lower 
court held the deed bearing date !fay 9th, 1945 defective 
and that it conveyed no property, and entered its judg-
ment fron1 'vhich this appeal is taken. (R. 45) 
Appellant filed timely objections to the judgn1ent, also a 
motion to assign the case for trial, a motion to amend her 
cross-complaint, and a motion for New Trial, all of which 
were denied by the lower court. (R. 44) (R. 48) 
The single question is whether that deed, dated ~fay 
9th, 1945, 'vhich the trial eourt held to be defective, con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
tained such description that the land might be identified 
which 'vas intended to be conveyed and therefore did 
convey the property. And 'vhether the trial court errored 
in denying appellant's motion to assign the case for trial 
and to per1nit appellant to amend her cross-complaint. 
STATEl\fENT OF POINTS RELIED (TPON 
1. 
THE DEED BEARING DATE MAY 9th, 1945 CONTAINS 
SUCH DESCRIPTION THAT THE INTENT OF THE GRAN-
TOR IS CLEARLY EXPRESSED. 
2. 
THE FALSE STATEMENT IN THE DESCRIPTION 
WILL NOT DEFEAT THE GRANT. 
3. 
THE DEED CONTAINS A DESCRIPTION WHICH A 
SURVEYOR COULD USE TO LOCATE THE PARCEL IN-
TENDED TO BE CONVEYED, ON THE GROUND. 
4. 
AN OMISSION OF PART OF A BOUNDARY OR CALL 
IS NOT FATAL TO THE VALIDITY OF A DEED WHERE 
SUCH BOUNDARIES OR CALLS CAN BE SUPPLIED OR 
THE DESCRIPTION RENDERED CERTAIN. 
5. 
IF THE DESCRIPTION MAY BE HELPED BY EX-
TRINSIC EVIDENCE, THEN APPELLANT IS ENTITLED 
TO A TRIAL AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRODUCE EX-
TRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
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THE DEED BEARING DATE l\1AY 9th, 1945 CONTAINS 
SUCH DESCRIPTION THAT THE INTENT OF THE GRAN-
TOR IS CLEARLY EXPRESSED. 
·By the description as contained in the deed, the 
grantor definitely established the point of beginning by 
tying to "the Northeast corner of Northwest 74 of sec. 
10 T 28 r. 1 E S.L.B.&~1"; he then describes the next 
four courses exactly as are described in the deed by which 
he received title, then it is clearly sho·wn that he intended 
to cut off the west jog and to follow a line on a course 
N.46°25'W being the same course as described in the deed 
by which grantor took title after going around the piece 
protruding on the west. Grantor describes this west line 
with particularity a distance of 404 feet more or less and 
it is shown by a portion of that which then follows that 
the grantor was intending to arrive at the Northeast 
corne·r of his property; true he does go off on an-
other angle but the distance he refers to is ±55 feet 
which is the distance from grantor's northeast corner as 
given in the deed by '"'hich he took title and the place 
of beginning, then grantor goes southeasterly using the 
same variation as his northwest line of 46°25'W est the 
same distance of 154 feet, then he follo,vs approximately 
the north line of the tract 'Yhich it is evident he intended 
to omit, the san1e distance 'Yhich that north line carries. 
It is further evident that "rhen the grantor inserted the 
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words "beginning'' he thought he had described to the 
place of beginning. 
POINT II. 
THE FALSE STATEMENT IN THE DESCRIPTION 
WILL NOT DEFEAT THE GRANT. 
The last calls locate nothing nor do they change the 
westerly line 'vhich the grantor specifically defined and 
which line did follow the true course. Those calls are 
surplusage and may be disregarded. 
In 2 Devlin on Deeds, Third Ed. Vol. 2, at section 
1013a we find the law stated as follows: 
"If the land conveyed can be identified by the 
other calls of the description an impossible or 
senseless course will not be considered," citing 
Brose v. Boise City, R.R. 5 Idaho 695. 
and at section 1035 we find the follo,ving: 
"If a description is otherwise complete and 
accurate, a false statement in it will not defeat 
the grant." 
In Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed. Vol. 6, 
Formal Parts of Deeds at Section 327 4, page 445 we 
find the following: 
"Rejection of false or erroneous description. 
After an accurate description, an inaccurate de-
scription follo"ring which is Inerely cumulative will 
be rejected. Thus, 'vhere the deed contains two 
descriptions, one of which describes the land "\vith 
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reasonable certainty, and the other is incorrect 
in some particulars, the incorrect particular will 
be rejected as surplusage. "\Vhere the land is suf-
ficiently described for the purpose of identifica-
tion after eliminating an incorrect part of the des-
cription, the deed is read as if such description 
were eliminated and effect is given to the remain-
ing part of the description." 
Citing Vaughn v. Continental Royalty Co., 116 
Fed. (2d) 72; 
Hanlon v. Western Loan, ±6 Cal. App. (2d) 580, 
116 P. (2d) 465; 
Mizell v. Osmon, 324 Mo. 321, 189 SW 2d 306; 
State v. Franco-American Soc. (Tex.) 172 SW 2d 
731; 
Copeland v. Carpenter, 206 Ga. 822, 59 SE 2d 245; 
DeLong v. Starkey, 120 Ind. App. 288, 92 NE 2d 
228. 
In 2 Devlin on Deeds, Third Ed., \: ol. 2, at section 
1012, p. 1916 it is said: 
'~What is a sufficient description. A deed is 
not void for uncertainty because there 1nay be 
errors or an inconsistency in some of the particu-
lars. If a surveyor, by applying the rules of sur-
veying can locate the land, the description is 
sufficient and the deed 'vill be sustained. And 
generally, the rule may be stated to be that the 
deed will be sustained if it is possible from the 
whole description to ascertain and identify the 
land intended to be eonveyed." 
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"As that is certain \\"hich can be made certain, 
the description if it \vill enable a person of ordin-
ary prudence acting in good faith and making 
inquiries \Yhich the description \vould suggest 
to him, to identify the land is sufficient." 
Citing Ford, S.D. 124 NW 1108. 
I-Iayes v. ~fartin, 144 Ala. 532, 40 So. 204. 
In Tho1npson on Real Property above cited, Section 
3271 Pocket Supp. at page 60 it is said: 
.. When the description in a deed is erroneous, 
that which is intended to be conveyed, rather than 
that which is descr.ibed, is conveyed. A subsequent 
erroneous addition will not be permitted to limit 
or impair what has been definitely described in 
the deed." (Italics added.) 
Citing U.S. v. Big Bend Transit, 42 Fed. Supp. 
459; 
Bruni v. Viduarri, 140 Tex. 138, 166 SW 2d 81. 
POINT III. 
THE DEED CONTAINS A DESCRIPTION WHICH A 
SURVEYOR COULD USE TO LOCATE THE PARCEL IN-
TENDED TO BE CONVEYED, ON THE GROUND. 
By the affidavit attached to appellant's 1notion for 
New Trial it is stated that appellant was prepared to 
offer the testimony of ·C.C. Bush of the engineering firm 
of Bush & Gudgell to the effect that he could locate the 
land on the ground from the description contained in the 
deed. By the court's granting judgment on the pleadings 
the appellant was not afforded the opportunity to intro-
duce such evidence. 
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The granting of judgment on the pleadings without a 
trial of this case is, we contend, no more favored by our 
courts than are Summary Judgments, this because liti-
gants are prevented from fully presenting their case to 
the court. Such 'vas the holding in Brandt v. Springville 
Bank, lOU 2d 350, 353 P2d 460 in which the court said : 
"For the reason that a summary judgment 
prevents litigants from fully presenting their 
case to the court, courts are, and should be, re-
luctant to invoke this remedy." 
And in Morris v. Farnsworth j\:Iotel, 123 U. 289, 259 
P2d 297 our court said: 
"The party against whom the summary judg-
ment is granted is entitled to the benefit of having 
the court consider all of the facts presented." 
That statement of law followed the ruling of our 
court in R. J. Dawn Const. Co., v. Child, 122 U. 194, 247 
P2d 817. 
The same rule of law applies in this case where judg-
ment has been granted on pleadings. Applicant has n 
defense to the action and she pleaded it. 
The rule if a surveyor, by applying the rules of sur-
veying can locate the land, the description is sufficient 
and the deed will be sustained is announced in 2 Devlin 
on Deeds, Third Ed., Vol. 2, Section 1012 at page 1916, 
which rule is also followed in Blume v. l\IacGregor, 
(Cal.) 148 P2d at 661, Best v. Wohlford, 144 Cal. 733, 78 
Pac. 293; Thou1pson v. 1\fcl{enna, 22 Cal. App. 129, 132, 
133 P. 512, and 16 A1n. J ur. Deeds, Sec. 263, p. 586. 
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In the Blu1ne v. l\facGregor case '"e find the follow-
ing statement at page 661. 
H In general if a competent surveyor can take 
the deed and locate the land on the ground from 
the description contained therein, 'vith or without 
the aid of extrinsic evidence, the description will 
be held to be sufficient." 
In Harrison v. Everett, 308 P2d 216, citing Wheeler 
Perry ·Co. v. Mortgage Bond Co. (Ariz.) 17 P2d 331 in-
volving question of priority of lien of mortgag~ as 
against judgment where debtors had filed Homestead 
Declaration describing therein Lots 13 and 14, Mount 
Pleasant tract and omitting the Block No. 4 from the 
description, as a result the judgment creditor c-ontended 
that because of the erroneous description the declaration 
was ineffectual, the court said: 
"A description of the property is essential 
to a valid declaration of homestead but the de-
scription need not be more particular than is re-
quired in the case of a deed." Then follows cita-
tion of many of the authorities heretofore referred 
to. The court going on further said: "It will be 
seen from the foregoing that the description of the 
land as embodied in the declaration "\Vas sufficient 
to afford a means of identification and therefore 
fulfills the requirements of a particular descrip-
tion." 
POINT IV. 
AN OMISSION OF PART OF A BOUNDARY OR CALL 
IS NOT FATAL TO THE VALIDITY OF A DEED WHERE 
SUCH BOUNDARIES OR CALLS CAN BE SUPPLIED OR 
THE DESCRIPTION RENDERED CERTAIN. 
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The intention of the parties is to be ascertained 
by considering all the provisions of the deed, as well as 
the situation of the parties, and then to give effect to 
such intention if practical, when not contrary to law. 
2 Devlin on Deeds, Third Ed. Vol. 2, section 836, p. 1508. 
In Holleys Ext. v. Curry, 58 ''r· \T a. 70, 51 SE 135, 
112 Am. St. Rep. 944, and in 18 CJ 180, 181, 26 CJS 
Deeds, Sec. 30 and 100, pp 210 and 357, and in Sanders v. 
Baker, 231 SW 2d 106 (Ark.) it is said that the office 
of a description in a deed is not to identify the land but 
to furnish means of identification. 
This rule is also announced in Thompson on Real 
Property (Perm. Ed.) \r ol. 6, Pocket Supp. Sec. 3268. 
Section 1013d, 2 Devlin further says : 
"The principal purpose of the construction is 
to ascertain the true intent of the language and 
when that intent has been ascertained, it should 
be allowed to have paramount force and great 
liberality is always exercised in constructing that 
part of the deed in which the property conveyed 
is described and the description will be sufficient 
if it supplies the means for identifying the land 
to be conveyed." 
And in 26 ·CJ·s, Sees. 30 and 100, pp· 210 and 357 the 
law is stated as follo\YS : 
~'A deed 'viii not be held void for uncertainty 
of description if hy any reasonable construction it 
can be n1ade available." 
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In Devlin at section 1013 it is further said: 
··'\There the description is uncertain, refer-
ence may be 1nade to prior deeds conveying the 
same land." 
The deed by which L. \V. 1-Io,vard took title may be 
ref erred to. 
POINT V. 
IF THE DESCRIPTION MAY BE HELPED BY EX-
TRINSIC EVIDENCE, THEN APPELLANT IS ENTITLED 
TO A TRIAL AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRODUCE EX-
TRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
We find Tiffany on Real Property, Third Ed., sec-
tion 997 reads as follows: 
""\Vith the exception of the broad principals 
that a conveyance will not be declared void for 
insufficiency in its description of the property 
which it purports to convey if it is possible by any 
reasonable rule of construction, aided by extrinsic 
ev.idence, to identify the property intended, it is 
impossible to give any general rules by which to 
detennine whether in the case of any particular 
conveyance the description is sufficiently opera-
tive. The court will, if possible, with the aid of 
evidence introduced for the purpose, find a par-
ticular piece of land 'vhich the description serves 
to differentiate from other land." (Italics added.) 
In Devlin it is said that the fourth side of a rectangle 
may be supplied 'vhere the intent of the parties is clear, 
and the grantee has entered into possession. Respondents 
will probably contend that our description is not that of 
a rectangle, this 've concede but our description is more 
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than a rectangle and all the more shows the intent of 
the grantor, he having specifically followed the variances 
and distances to the closing line. 
Devlin also states at section 1013b: 
"A description is sufficient where there is 
but one line to find to locate the land as the land 
conveyed may be identified by extrinsic evidence." 
In the instant case there is but one line to find1 that 
is the closing line. 
And at Section 103la Devlin states: 
"If a deed omits one of .the calls in the field 
notes, yet if, by the description ·given and revers-
ing the calls in the field notes, . the missing call 
can be supplied, and the land to be conveyed as-
certained, the deed is not· V-oid for uncertainty." 
Citing 1\{ontgomery. v. Carlton,~ 56 Tex. 431. 
In Deal v. Cooper, 94 .~fo. 62, 6 S\V .707 the court 
held that if it ap-pears there is an·_9bvious ·omission in the 
description but the deed affords sufficient data to supply 
the omission, the def~ct "\Yill be cured by construction. 
And this Court in Losee v. Jones, 120 U. 385, 235 
. -
P2d 132 at page 137 in speaking of- an omission said: 
"Appellants riext iaise the contention that 
the deed from the In other_ to Elenora Jones Bing-
luun is void by reason of an erroneous description 
whereby the calls fail to close.· In their brief they 
quote from Patton on Titles, Sec. 7 4, p. 265, as 
follows: 
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HEither as actually described or construed, 
the lines the1nselves must be continuous, one com-
tnencing \Vhere the other leaves off, and the final 
line returning to the point of beginning. Other-
wise, they do not inclose, and therefore do not 
describe any tract of land." 
"This may be due to omission of one of the 
lines from the description or to a mis-description 
of one of the lines. To a certain extent, however, 
this situation has been overcome by the fact that 
the courts will supply the line by intend1nent when 
by so doing the boundaries \\rill be complete and 
will close approximately the acreage called for in 
the description. Also, a 1nanifest error in the 
calls may be corrected even to the extent of revers-
ing the direction of a line. Even when the lines are 
continuous, they may fail to enclose any tract of 
land owing to failure of the final line to return to 
the starting point. Unless the description as 
stated, or as it may be allowably construed, can 
be made to close, the grant must fail." 
"In the construction of boundaries, we 
again find that the intention of the parties is the 
controlling consideration. ~Iachado v. Title, Guar-
anty & Trust Co., 15 Cal. 2d 180, 99 P. 2d 245; 
Park v. Wilkinson, 21 Utah 279, 60 P. 945. In 
the present case, we believe the Elenora Jones 
Bingham deed capable of such construction as to 
form an enclosure in accordance with the intent 
expressed therein. The deed fixes a definite and 
clear point of beginning, continues by courses 
and distances to the last corner, and then con-
cludes : '~ * * * thence east 2.5 chains more or less 
to the place of beginning." 
"~.\.s stated by this court in the case of Park v. 
''rilkinson, 21 Utah 279, 60 P. 945, 946: "The 
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words used in the deed should be construed so as 
to ascertain the intention of the parties making 
it, and when the intention of the parties can be 
ascertained therefrom, nothing re1nains to effectu-
ate that intention.' 
"But when there are no natural monuments 
or lines called for by \\rhich the closing line is to 
be fixed or ascertained, and no line on the ground, 
it follows, of necessity, that the survey is to be 
closed by a direct line between the termini of the 
lines on the ground, or as fixed by the courses and 
distances returned to ascertain those termini." 
It is conceded that in the Losee case "rhile the de-
scription as given did not close it recited ''to the place 
of beginning.'' However 've contend the principal of law 
as laid down by said case is applicable inasmuch as the 
court in the Losee case refers to Ransberry v. Broad-
head, a Pennsylvania case, 174 Atl. 97 'vhich 'vas a case 
to test title to part of a stream and land adjoining, the 
description of the property did not close and one of the 
defenses set up was defective description in that it failed 
to close. In quoting fron1 the ease "'"e find the following: 
"Appellant urges that the description in the 
Stites' deed will not close. The court said the 
course, the metes and bounds must be considered, 
they should be follovved and, if possible, made 
to close, but as indicated in Wharton v. Carvin, 
34 Pa. 340, 342, 'vhere there are no natural or arti-
ficial n1onuments by "'"hich to close the line, it 
follows of neeessity that the suryey should be 
closed by di rPct line between the termini of the 
line established on the ground. That is 'vhat 'vas 
done in the ease and "~e see no error in it." 
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Frorn vVharton v. Garvin, 34 Pa. 340, cited in above 
case we quote the following: 
"Generally a survey is to be carried to its 
calls, unless there are actual lines on the ground 
excluding them. In that case the lines on the 
ground will control the calls, for they constitute 
the survey. But UJhen there are no natural monu-
ments or lines called for, by which the clo,s~ng line 
is to be fixed and ~ascerta:ined, and no line on the 
ground, it follottvs of necessity, that the survey 
is to be closed by a direct l~ne between the term-
ini of the lines on the ground, or as fixed by the 
courses and distances returned, to ascertain these 
termini. It was ascertained in this case, that the 
north and south boundaries, by their courses and 
distances, did not reach the river by the number 
of rods already stated. And if we are· to discard 
the river as a call, then the west boundary must 
necessarily be closed by a straigwht line from point 
to point of the side lines. There is no other proc-
ess by which it may be done." (Italics added.) 
The above wording is adopted by the Utah court in 
Park v. Wilkinson, supra. 
An interesting case in point where there is neither 
call for the last course or the words, "to beginning," is 
that of Blume v. ~facGregor, (Cal.) 148 P2d 656 in which 
we find the court stating at page 660 : 
"The true issue as to the ten foot strip as de-
veloped at the trial arose from the fact that the 
description of the land conveyed in 1884 by Pacific 
Improvement Co. to California and Nevada Rail-
road Company omitted certain courses and dis-
tances and if follo,ved literally described an ir-
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regular parcel varying in width from approxi-
mately 14 feet at its narrowest, to over 80 feet 
at its widest, and would only close by drawing an 
arbitrary line from the end of the last course given 
to the point of beginning. In view of the fact 
that this 1884 conveyance was expressed to be a 
strip of land for the right of way of its railroad, 
the missing courses and distances fairly suggest 
themselves on the face of the deed, bearing in 
mind the well-known fact that railroad rights of 
way are commonly strips of land of uniform 
width." 
'The court there further said : 
''Such interpretation must be given to a deed 
as to make it effective rather· than to defeat it." 
Hall v. Bartless, 158 Cal. 638, 642, 112 P. 176; 9 
Cal. Jur. 258-9. 
''An omission of part of the boundaries or 
calls is not fatal to the validity of a deed, where 
such boundaries or calls can be supplied or the 
description rendered certain." 
26 CJS Deeds, Sec. 30, p. 220; 18 C.J. 185, and 
numerous cases there cited. 
''If the description is indefinite, as by the 
omission of a line, then a statement of the quantity 
may help to locate the boundaries. 4 Cal. Jur. 
404; 9 Cal. Jur. 314-5." 
The grantor conveyed to defendant 2.75 acres more 
or less. In order to convey this acreage it is necessary 
to surround a tract of land. By supplying the last call, 
grantor would have conveyed approxiinately the acreage 
called for by the deed. Then too, grantor expressly con-
veyed a tract out of which he had previously conveyed 
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the Temple and Woods and theatre tracts. ~.,rom a read-
ing of authorities on Deeds and conveyancing it is clear-
ly evident that had the grantor, L. W. Howard simply 
described 2.75 acres, 1nore or less the starting point com-
mencing at a point 2.07 ch. W. and 8.52°30' E.5.24 ch 
from Northeast cor. of Northwest :1;4 of sec. 10, T2 SR.l 
E.S.L.B.&M. out of a tract from which the Temple & 
Woods and the theatre tracts had been conveyed, it would 
have been sufficient. This is the only tract owned by L. 
W. Howard in this particular area. It is to be noted too 
that the abstractors in the County Recorder's Office were 
able to detennine that property intended to be conveyed, 
having indexed the property in NWl)tNE14 & NEVi 
NWlfi Sec. 10-2S-1E. (See notation on left side of deed 
(R. 43). 
In 16 Am. Jur. Deeds, Sec. 265 at page 587 we find 
the following statement of law: 
"It may be laid down as a general rule that 
a deed conveying a part of a tract of land or a 
given number of acres out of a tract is not void 
for uncertainty although it does not attempt to 
locate the part of the tract conveyed. In a few 
cases, however, conveyances have been held to be 
ineffectual and void for uncertainty where the 
land is described merely as a fractional part of 
a designated tract or where in addition to giving 
the acreage the deed ineffectually atte1npts to 
locate specifically the land conveyed. Even under 
this view, a conveyance of a specified number of 
acres designated as being located at a given corner 
of a designated lot or tract is sufficient to sustain 
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the deed which will be construed as conveying 
· a tract containing the designated number of acres 
in a square form." 
In Jones v. lV[abrey, 225 SW2d 561 ('Tenn.) it "\Vas 
held that a deed purporting to convey a stated number of 
unlocated acres, bounded by general specifications, out 
of a larger tract of land pres1L111ably owned by the grantor 
is not void. 
We find an interesting case in which the last call 
of the description of a proposed . new ordinance was 
omitted and no reference contained carrying the descrip-
tion to the place of beginning, in that of Central Mission 
Oil & City of St. James, 111 SW2d 215, 232 Mo. App. 142. 
"An action was brought to test the validity of 
the ordinance extending the limits of the city of 
St. James. Plaintiffs objecting to the ordinance 
claimed that it was invalid because the call on the 
east line was omitted. The court said that al-
though there is a manifest omission in the descrip-
tion of the new line as it passes around the ball 
park, yet there is sufficient data from which the 
omission can be easily supplied and the descrip-
tion hereby rendered certain. The description 
shows clearly the omission of the line running 
from the eastern terminus of the line on the north 
side of the ball park to the beginning of the line 
running 'vest on the south side of the ball park~ 
the call omitted being 'thence south 551 feet along 
the east side of ball park to pin.' 'Ve think it is 
obvious that it was the intention to surround the 
ball park. Three sides are accurately described, 
all the corners defined and located, and it seems 
to us that a person of common understanding can 
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readily sup ply the omitted li,nc. The ~arne rule 
applies to descriptions in extension proceedings 
as applies to descriptions in deeds. The court 
there further says: 'Our Supreme Court in Deal 
v. Cooper, 94 NW 62, said, "\\Then the deed applied 
to the subject matter shows a manifest omission 
in the description and there is sufficient data fur-
nished by the deed to supply the omission, the 
omission will be supplied by construction." N u-
merous other cases supporting this rule of law 
are therein cited. (Italics added.) 
The question might arise whether the law and cases 
herein contained apply to a deed of gift, one without con-
sideration. On this point we cite IIazelett v. Bryan, 192 
Tenn. 251, 241 SW2d 121 \vhich held that equity will 
reform a description in favor of a donee in a deed of gift. 
See also 69 ALR, p. 416. Thompson on Real Property 
(Perm. Ed.) Vol. 6 Pocket Supp. Deeds. Sec. 3275. 
It appears that the legislature of the State of Utah 
has not enacted laws 'vhich might act as a guide on this 
point, as have some of the states. We do find however, 
in the footnotes to Section 57-1-12, UCA 1953 on the form 
of Warranty Deed, a reference to 69 ALR 423 on reforma-
tion of conveyance, right to as depending upon considera-
tion. This annotation is found following the case of 
Launderville v. l\Ietro, Montana, 281 Pac. 7 49, which is in 
point and in which case the plaintiff brought action to 
reform a deed which had been given to her without con-
sideration passing as against another heir of the deceased 
grantor. The question 'vas raised in the defense to the 
action as to the right to have the deed reformed as it 'vas 
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but a voluntary deed and the mistake. was not a mutual 
mistake as the grantee had no knowledge of the deed 
having been executed. The court held that the reason 
for the rule that equity will not reform a·voluntary deed 
as against the donor does n<?t exist ~n. favor of his heirs, 
and that a court of equity has inherent power in a proper 
case to reform a voluntary ·conveyance so as to have the 
deed express the intention.·-of the grantor, even though, 
strictly speaking, the mistake is- not. mutua~. T~e above 
case is an old case and appears to have been followed 
repeatedly to the p-resent day. 
.. 
In Harth v. Roper, 88 SE 2d 142, 242 N.C. 489 the 
court said the fact that there were five calls in the .deed 
and that if the calls were surveyed _as called· for in the 
deed, lines would not close, did not render the. description 
incomplete. 
And in White v. Spahr, 59 SE2d 916, 207 _Ga. 10 it 
is said: 
"'The description of land contained in a deed 
is not void for uncertainty if it furnishes a key 
to identify the land." See also Lev.ris v. Bowen, 
75 SE 2d 422. 
In Blue Ridge v. Telfair, 54 SE 2d 608, 205 ·Ga. 808 
the court said : 
"v\There it can be gathered from v.rords em-
ployed in a deed that intention of grantor was to 
convey the whole of a tract of land owned by him, 
even a vague .description of the tract 'lcill suffice 
~~ by aid of competent parol evidence its precise 
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locat_ion is capable of ascertainment and its -iden-
tity can be established." (Italics added.) 
And in Brown v. Hurley, 90 SE 2d 324, 243 N.C. 138 
the Court held that even if a boundaries description .does 
not go entirely around the land it does not invalidate the 
description. 
It is stated in 16 Am. J ur. Deeds page 585 that the 
courts are extremely liJberal in construing descriptions 
of premises conveyed with the view of determining 
whether these descriptions are suff.iciently definite and 
certain to ident~fy land and ·make the instrument opera-
tive .as a conveyance. (Italics added.) Following this 
rule of la'v we find in Nolen v. Henry, 190 Ala. 540, which, 
while an old case appears to be one repeatedly followed 
by courts of other jurisdictions, the court said : 
"It is of course, well settled that the law leans 
against the destruction of a deed for uncertainty 
of description, but will construe the deed, where 
it can be done consistently with legal rules, so as 
to give effect to the intention of the parties, and 
not to defeat it. Every .deed o1tght to be so con-
strued, if it can, that the intent of the parties may 
prevail and not be defeate:d." (Italics added.) 
In closing we cite 16 Am. Jur. Deeds, Sec. 263, p. 
586 as follows : 
''The fact that parts of the description given 
of the property are incorrect or incomprehensible 
will not destroy the operative effect of a convey-
ance, if a sufficient part of the description remains 
for purposes of identification." 
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and Sec. 288. "An uncertain general description will also 
be controlled by a more specific and certain description." 
CONCLUSION 
That description contained in the deed placing the 
northwest corner of the property clearly out of the course 
followed by the definite north south line on the west is 
surplusage and is not to be considered. The last course 
carrying the description to the place of beginning 'vhich 
must be supplied to enclose the property, defendant is 
entitled to have supplied under her reformation action 
in order to carry out the intent of the grantor. Tllis may 
be done by the court as pointed out by our O"\vn Supreme 
Court in Park v. Wilkinson, 21 Utah, at page 284 here-
tofore referred to wherein the court quoted from one of 
the accepted rules of law as follows: 
"But 'Yhen there are no natural monuments 
or lines called for by which the closing line is to be 
fixed or ascertained, and no line on the ground, it 
follows of necessity that the survey is to be closed 
by a direct line between the termini of the lines 
on the ground, or as fixed by the courses and dis-
tances returned to ascertain those termini." 
While it appears the distance of the 'vest line as 
given in the deed of 404 feet did not quite reach the 
Northwest corner of the land as described in the deed by 
which L. W. Howard received title, it is clearly apparent 
that Mr. Howard intended to go to that corner as he 
gave this call as 404 feet more or less. Following the 
rule of law above stated and the northwest corner being 
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established by the deed by which L. W. Howard took title 
the line should continue to that corner then the last call 
or closing call should extend from the termini of that cor-
ner to the place of beginning. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. V. BACKMAN of 
Backman, Backman & Clark 
Attorneys for .Appellant 
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